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Abstract. In the article, first I  present the atheistic argument from pointless 
evil and the argument from chance. The essence of the argument from chance 
consists in the incompatibility of the existence of purposeless events and the 
existence of a God who planned the universe to the last detail. Second, I would 
like to show that there is a relation between the evidential argument from evil 
and the argument from chance. An analysis of the theistic argument from small 
probabilities is a  helpful starting point for the presentation of how the two 
arguments are related.
I. ON THE ARGUMENT FROM CHANCE FOR THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF GOD
In what follows I will first present the atheistic argument from pointless 
evil and the argument from chance. The essence of the argument from 
chance consists in the incompatibility of the existence of purposeless 
events and the existence of a God who planned the universe to the last 
detail. Second, I would like to show that there is a relation between the 
evidential argument from evil and the argument from chance.
One of the strongest atheistic arguments for the non-existence of 
God is the argument from evil, in particular, the evidential argument 
from evil. The argument in its basic form – as constructed by William 
Rowe – can be presented as follows:
(1) There exists pointless evil in the world.
(2) An omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect being would not 
permit the occurrence of any case of pointless evil in the world.
1 I am grateful to Elżbieta Łukasiewicz for her reading and comments on this paper.
200 DARIUSZ ŁUKASIEWICZ
Hence:
(3) God does not exist.
In an  analogous way, it is possible to build an  argument for the non-
existence of God from chance. It goes on as follows:
(4) There exist chance events in the world.
(5) An omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect being would not 
permit the occurrence of any case of chance in the world.
Hence:
(3) God does not exist.
Perhaps it is worth noting that the argument from chance has never been 
very popular or frequently discussed, unlike the argument from evil. 
The reason might be that the concept of chance is very ambiguous, and, 
at the same time, in many cases it seems to be theologically harmless. 
Secondly, many theists believe that one can easily reject premise (4) in 
the argument from chance by saying simply that there are no chance 
events in the world.
The crucial issue is how to understand ‘chance’ in the context of the 
argument from chance. It might seem that the atheistic argument from 
chance could be sound and valid if chance is understood in an ontological 
way and not as an epistemic concept, that is as our lack of knowledge and 
ignorance, which is logically harmless for theism. ‘Ontological chance’ 
could mean several things, for example:
(a) an event which does not have any cause or any causal explanation;
(b) a purposeless event (an event without purpose or an event that 
hasn’t been planned or intended by anyone);
(c) an  unpredictable event (unpredictable even for an  omniscient 
being);2
(d) an event whose happening is extremely improbable.
However, I  will try to show that the existence of ontological chance 
(random events) is not necessarily incompatible with theism. In other 
words, even if such events happen, they do not make the atheistic 
argument from chance sound. The justification of the last claim requires 
an explanation of the principles of the theology of chance in more detail.3
2 This meaning of chance is at play if an omniscient being exists in time and the world 
has an indeterministic nature, as current quantum physics suggests.
3 The scientific reasons of ‘theology of chance’ have been discussed by David 
J. Bartholomew in his two books closely related to the topic: (1984) (2008).
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Before we do that, we will consider the argument from chance 
in which chance is understood as a  very improbable and purposeless 
event, and, therefore, we will call this argument ‘the argument from 
small probabilities’. The argument from small probabilities deserves our 
attention because it can be used both by a theist and by an atheist.
The theist can argue as follows: if an event had a very small probability, 
like, for example, the emergence of life on Earth, but it happened 
in reality nonetheless, then the cause of its happening was the action 
of God, and hence, of course, God exists.4 The atheist can argue for 
atheism as follows: if an event was very improbable, then it happened by 
chance (without any purpose or plan) and not by the action of God. If 
the universe has such a nature that the probability of the emergence of 
life and sentient beings on Earth or on any other planet was very small 
indeed, then the probability that God would have created the universe is 
very small too. Why so? Because an omnipotent being would not have 
created the world in which the probability of the existence of human 
beings as the pinnacle of creation – which is, perhaps, one of the most 
important Christian doctrines – was extremely small.
The atheist may also argue that God does not exist if he succeeds in the 
refutation of the theistic argument from very small probabilities. He can 
argue as follows: if an event, like the emergence of life and the appearance 
of human beings, whose probability was rather high and not extremely 
small (we will explain this high probability below), happened in reality, 
then there is a natural explanation of these events and the hypothesis 
of the existence of God is explanatorily useless. Moreover, the atheist 
can refer to the chance events as purposeless events, which, according 
to the Law of Large Numbers and in long-term outcomes, may lead to 
the emergence of life and the appearance of human beings as a result of 
cosmic and biological evolution. Some people even speak about ‘an order 
emerging out of chaos’ (Kaufmann 1995: 25). Thus, if the atheist were 
able to explain the happening of events which are usually attributed to 
God himself as their cause, then atheism would gain an argumentative 
advantage over theism, as, for example, Richard Dawkins believes.
An  evaluation of this atheistic argument will be a  bit easier if we 
pay attention to the theistic argument from very small probabilities 
mentioned above. The key point of this argument is exemplified by 
4 In fact this type of reasoning is used by the defenders of Intelligent Design (William 
Dembski, Michael Behe and their followers).
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the reasoning sometimes called ‘the significance test argument’. The 
reasoning of this type was made for the first time by John Arbuthnot – 
a physician to Queen Anne – who was trying to explain the distribution 
of female and male births in London in the seventeenth century (1710). 
Arbuthnot’s reasoning may be reconstructed in the following way:5
(6) The probability of a  male birth is equal to the probability of 
a female birth and it is ½ in every individual case.
(7) Every case of a male birth and a female birth is independent of 
other births as every result of tossing a coin is independent of 
other results of tossing the same coin.
(8) It is possible that during one year some fluctuations will happen 
regarding the proportion of male and female births, for example, 
there will be more male births than female ones, or, conversely, 
but in the long run the proportion will equal 50% males to 50% 
females.
(9) The empirical data gathered by Arbuthnot for London (the 
records from London’s parishes) extending over 82 years from 
1629 to 1710 confirmed that every year there were more male 
births than female births and this fact was inconsistent with the 
a priori assumption that the number of births will be equal in 
both cases.
(10) The probability that 82 times in succession more boys than girls 
will be born is (1/2)82 that means 0,2 x 10-24 and this is a very 
small probability indeed.
John Arbuthnot inferred from this fact that the event which was so 
improbable could not happen by chance. He concluded, therefore, that 
it was God and his Providence who is responsible for what happened. 
He even suggested a possible reason which God could have for allowing 
or causing that distribution of sex, namely to keep a  demographic 
equilibrium in the world because the number of boys should be larger 
than the number of girls since men die sooner than women.
Contemporary theists use, in principle, the same argumentative 
scheme in the arguments from small probabilities, but to much more 
complicated processes. If we assume, for example, that the appearance 
of life is a process consisting in the emergence of 2000 enzymes from 
5 Bartholomew (1984: 38-39).
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20 amino acids, then, as Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramashinge 
calculated, the probability of this event is 1/1040000. According to William 
Dembski’s calculations, the probability of the emergence of the bacterial 
flagellum (Escherichia coli) is 1 in (10263).6 It is worthy of note that, 
given such a calculation of the probability of the appearance of life as 
counted above, and given that the a priori probability of the existence 
of the Creator is minimal but larger than 0, for example 1/50 000, it is 
possible, by resorting to the Bayes theorem, to count the probability of 
God’s existence and this probability is almost one (0,98).7 Hence, theism 
is epistemically more viable and rational than atheism (Bartholomew 
1984: 57).
Another typical example of the application of the argument from 
very small probabilities is the fine-tuning hypothesis. According to 
this hypothesis, as some people claim, firstly, the probability of every 
cosmological constant, such as the speed of light, the constant of 
gravitational attraction, Planck’s constant, and so on, which is suitable to 
cosmic and biological evolution, is very small. Secondly, the probability 
of all of the fundamental constants of physics which are suitable to the 
emergence and the existence of life calculated by multiplying together 
all of these small probabilities is extremely small. If this is so, then the 
chance hypothesis should be rejected and one should assume that the 
values of the basic cosmological constants were chosen and determined 
by a super intelligent mind.
The criticism of this argument relies on the demonstration that it is 
not clear enough whether the cosmic constants are independent of one 
another; it is possible, for example, that the value of some constants is 
determined by the value of others. In that case the probability of all of them 
would be significantly larger. It seems that what plays a very important 
role here, though not only here, is our common intuition that all possible 
values of cosmological constants are equally probable.8 The principle of 
6 Bartholomew (2008: 110).
7 A= God exists, B= God does not exist, S = the existence of 2000 enzymes constructed 
from 20 amino acids.
P(A) = 1/50 000 and P(B) = 49 000/50 000 and P(S/B) = 1/1040 000.
P(S given A) or P(S/A) =1 because S can be taken as certain if God exists on the 
ground that he can bring about whatever he desires.
P(A given S)=[P(A) x P (S/A)] / [P(A) x P (S/A) + P(B) x P (S/B)]
P(A/S)= [1/50 000 x 1] / [1/50 000 x 1 + 49 000/50 000 x 1/1040 000] = 0.98.
8 Bartholomew (2008: 84).
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insufficient reason says that if there is no reason to prefer one quantity to 
others, then all of them should be treated as equally probable. However, 
the application of this principle to cosmic and biological evolution is 
highly questionable and the theistic argument from small probabilities is 
perhaps based on a false assumption that all possibilities have the same 
probability. It is not necessarily true that each of these possibilities is 
equally probable. It has been discovered that, given the same number 
and kind of chemical substances, each time they were mixed in the same 
conditions, the same organic structures appeared. This result undermines 
the assumption of equal probabilities of all possibilities and it undermines 
the assumption of the independence of random events. If we reject, 
however, both these assumptions, the probabilities in question will be 
completely different. There is a fundamental metaphysical mistake which 
has been made in the theistic argument from small probabilities and this 
mistake depends on the way cosmic and organic entities are conceived 
of, i.e. they are regarded as combinatorial and purely mechanical objects.
Let us take as an  exemplification of this mistake a  very simple 
mathematical case. If I  asked a  randomly chosen person to give 
an example of an odd number, then the probability that I would guess 
what that number is seems to be extremely small because the set of 
odd numbers is infinite. However, this is simply not true because the 
probability of my knowing the number chosen is in fact much greater. 
This is because one can presume that a  randomly asked person will 
choose one of the prototypical odd numbers from the set {3, 5, 7, 9, 
11, 13, 15}. We are dealing here with the effect of a  prototype (in its 
psychological version). An analogical phenomenon happens in nature 
and it is called ‘the attractor’, which makes one or some possibilities more 
probable than the rest of all possible ways how things could be. Simon 
Conway Morris has recently argued for the existence of convergence 
in the process of a biological evolution.9 The existence of convergence 
makes the number of empirical possibilities on the subsequent levels of 
evolution much smaller than it would be were it to follow from purely 
mathematical calculations.
Therefore, we are allowed to reject the theistic argument from small 
probabilities. However, we are not allowed to infer that the world is 
deterministic or that there are no purposeless events. The conclusion 
from our considerations is weaker; there are chance events in the world 
9 Conway Morris (2003: 328).
205ARGUMENT FROM CHANCE
as modern science tells us. On the quantum level, there is a radioactive 
decay of atoms, on the molecular level genetic mutations happen, and on 
the level of human history there are human free choices and free actions. 
However, according to the Law of Large Numbers in nature, we observe 
the emergence of complex, functionally well-organized structures from 
many purposeless events which are not designed by any mind. These 
structures – emerging from ‘chaos’ – can be described by mathematical 
equations. The explanation of why this order in nature exists does not 
require the existence of God, who was to design and perhaps also to 
cause everything that happened and happens in the universe. There is 
no need of such a  God and atheism seems to be a  rational and well-
grounded view. This conclusion seems to make the atheistic argument 
from chance stronger, which, let us repeat, goes as follows:
(4) There exist chance events in the world.
(5) An omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect being would not 
permit the occurrence of any case of chance in the world.
Hence:
(6) God does not exist.
The evidence for the truth of premise (4) is provided by modern science. 
The rationale for premise (5) is the following one: God as the Creator 
of the universe and the supreme mind – by definition – had to design 
the world to the last detail leaving no room for chance and purposeless 
events in the world created.10 Therefore, since such events happen in the 
world, God does not exist.
However, perhaps a  bit paradoxically, the criticism of the theistic 
argument from small probabilities provides reasons for theism. A theist 
can accept premise (4) of the atheistic argument but reject premise 
(5) of this argument. He can argue in the following way: if order can 
emerge in the world from a large number of random events (purposeless 
events), and such events really happen in the world, and, finally, order 
exists in the universe, then the existence of chance was in God’s plan. 
The existence of chance is not only consistent with the divine will and 
with God’s existence but it is part of God’s plan. The last statement is the 
essence of ‘the theology of chance’ which has been mentioned above: 
the existence of chance is not only consistent with God’s will and with 
10 van Woundenberg (2013: 33).
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God’s existence but it is part of the divine plan and Providence and it is 
an expression of divine perfection:
The picture of a  world in which the details take care of themselves, 
leaving the big issues to the Creator, is more appealing and more worthy 
of directing our worship. This, perhaps, is a case where we are too prone 
to see God in the image of man as someone who thinks control depends 
on overseeing every detail.11
If this were so, then the critique of the theistic argument from small 
probabilities would be a very useful tool for theists and their refutation 
of the atheistic argument from evil; let us remember this argument again:
(1) There exists pointless evil in the world.
(2) An omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect being would not 
permit the occurrence of any case of pointless evil in the world.
Hence:
(3) God does not exist.
Now, there exists pointless evil in the world (undeserved suffering in 
various forms) and at least some of those events are due to chance and are 
not designed by God. Such an order of the universe is not only logically 
and metaphysically possible, but it is morally just and theologically 
adequate.12 Or, in brief: if there are purposeless events in the world, some 
of them can be evil.
And, finally, if there is no reason and no purpose for some events 
in the world, then, we may say, God is hidden in the mass of pointless 
events. But His hiddenness is only a hint how He acts in the universe of 
which He is the Maker and the only Lord.
Nicolai Hartmann had a  truly deep insight into the nature of our 
world when he said that:
It is absolutely plausible that to a finite mind something can appear to 
be contradictory which is fully possible in reality. A finite mind cannot 
11 Bartholomew (2008: 153).
12 Bartholomew states ‘The bizarre picture of God seated in front of a celestial control 
panel watching microscopic happenings throughout the universe and reacting to them 
almost instantaneously may be logically possible but it hardly fits with the notion of the 
loving Father of orthodox Christian belief, neither does it accord with our idea of how 
high level control should take place’ (2008: 153). Divine control in the world without 
chance is especially important if we try to explain the possibility of human freedom.
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grasp the possibilities of the coexistence of things because it is not able to 
apprehend the whole of the universe.13 [my translation DŁ]
Thus, the coexistence of purposeless events and God’s plan is possible 
and it is possible as well that there exists a  perfect and loving God.14 
The atheistic argument from chance is not sound and the evidential 
argument from evil is not sound either. It seems to me, however, that 
the criticism of the argument from chance is useful for a theist and for 
his refutation of the atheistic argument from evil in its evidential form. 
The two arguments are logically related which I was trying to show in 
my paper.
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